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'Defense' Budget

By VVAW

DEFENSE? OFFENSE? NONSENSE! TRILLIONS FOR WHAT?

Lots of kids have fantasies where they have all the money in the world in order to buy any toy they want—not only any toy but all of them together: a perpetual Christmas, and when something new pops up on the TV screen, save once and it appears in the living room. Usually, these fantasies run into such blocks as parents and budgets.

But not if you happen to be an admiral or a general in the U.S. military. Any toy you want and the more complicated the better. And if your toy happens to have small problems—like the U.S.S. Nimitz where a plane landed crooked, killed 14 Gis and burned up well over $100 million worth of equipment—take it to the shop and get it fixed. Or buy a new one!

And because of the clout of the military and the military industry, there are no parents to say no; in fact, Congressional committees and the Reagan Administration insist on pouring in more money, not less. It's every kid's dream come true.

There are, however, several small problems: it's our money these overgrown children are flinging around and worse yet, they're not getting a whole hell of a lot for it. And neither are we, the American taxpayer. While the final figures are still not in, it looks like the Pentagon will be given $136 billion to play with for the next year. Plans for the next five years carry a price tag of $1.5 trillion, more than double the cost of World War II. It's for sure enough money to buy toys for all the generals and all the admirals so that each of them can have his own little project.

All of this will be brought to you by the same Pentagon which produced the raid into the Iranian desert to free the hostages, with helicopters falling apart on the trip and those which made it finally crashing into each other once it was decided they couldn't pull off the job. And this was carried off with the best in brainpower, manpower, equipment and as much money as was needed!

As many Vietnam vets will recall, the U.S. military was in sorry shape at the end of the war (as well as during the war). Not only had we just finished losing a war against a small, unsophisticated enemy, but the higher military leadership had, for the most part, commanded nothing larger than a desk in combat; lower-ranking officers were leaving the service as quickly as they could, as were NCO's by the thousands. Combined with the problems of being unable to trust our own military leaders was the additional problem of equipment; who doesn't remember the lectures (in the safety of a U.S. training camp, of course) about the newest of electronic sensors, sophistica-missles, tanks that would leap streams—and on and on. No matter what you heard, however, once in 'Nam you were faced with the reality that sappers snuck in the U.S. camps almost any time they wanted to, that infiltration continued, and that the U.S. lost the war.

It's not that the Carter Administration was not projecting big bucks for the military; their projections called for only about $1 trillion over the next five years. But at least they didn't froth at the mouth like the Reaganites who have successfully built the Soviet Union into the master manipulator in the world today with greasy paws in each and every situation which the U.S. faintly dislikes. And while Reagan and Haig froth at the mouth, the military licks its chops at the prospect of more and more bucks.

The bucks, to a large extent, don't even go into the kind of projects that follow the Reagan proclamations: the Navy, for instance, is trying to drum up the money to bring the battleships New Jersey and Iowa out of mothballs, and to build more aircraft carriers, large enough to replace a large airport. It take no brilliant military strategist to see that floating football fields are not going to be difficult targets for the Soviet Air Force in an all-out war, conventional or nuclear, nor are they quite what's needed to rapidly deploy a large force of troops in some far off corner of the world overnight. They are, however, remarkably useful to sail into San Salvador or Panama, or even more likely, various oil-producing capitals in the Mideast where a U.S. presence is "desirable." While Reagan an Haig & Co rapidly declare their anti-Soviet policies, it seems that they are taking military care to be ready to take on third world countries.

While the overall thinking of the administration and its military masterminds comes straight out of the 19th century, the gimmickry is pure 20th—or maybe 21st century. The guiding principle seems to be that if it is fancier ( and therefore cost more money) it's got to be good. Whether it's useable or not is secondary. The Army, for instance, wants to spend a cool billion over the next 5 years for 44,000 laser-guided Copperhead anti-tank missiles which will gobble up Russian tanks ( a forward observer will aim the lazer beam). It sounds like a great weapon for the desert, where observers can see for miles ( although if the observer can see he can also be seen, and presumably the bad guys would prefer him not to guide the missile) but in rough terrain, such as much of Western Europe, the gadget doesn't seem quite worth the price.

Other problems pop up. In mid June began sea trials for the first Trident submarine; it was supposed to be working two and a half years ago; the cost has gone up to 35% ( the first sub will cost close to $2 billion). There were little problems: of 36,000 welds that required inspection, a quarter had not been inspected, and a third of these were defective—not a big problem, perhaps, on the family car, but a significant problem to the crew of a sub at the bottom of the ocean.

There there's the Army's masterwork, the M1 Abrams tank. This star-wars delight has s lazer range-finder to tell the gunner the distance to a target, and a computer stabilizer which allows the tank to fire accurately while moving. It also has treads that fall off, dust filters which have to be cleaned each 75-100 miles ( making the crews excellent targets), a blind spot 27 feet in front of the tank making it difficult to see small obstacles like mines, and, because of its size, a basic inability to be transported (thought the Army is working on a special—and expensive—railroad car to move the thing). Probably the most significant comment on the technological wizardry is the request from the tank crews giving the M1 its trial runs that the computer stabilizer be equipped with an "off" switch ( a request denied by the brass)! To buy one of these, should it ever get working, will cost as much as three of the old M-60 tanks.

Examples go on and on, but the basic problems are clear. The Pentagon and the great defense thinkers don't know what kind of war they want to fight so, like the man who jumped on his horse and rode off in all directions, they fumble every which way looking for the magic technological solution. Second, when a senior officer spends a couple of million dollars of our money on some pet project, that project will be a "success"! If that "success" required faking tests or creating needs ( and later killing Gis) that makes little difference—a career is at stake!

Perhaps admirals and generals should be given all their toys and sent away where they can't hurt anyone. But since the tax dollars of the American people are not a bottomless pit, and since Reagan & CO believe that only big business should benefit from government activity, the huge defense budget means cutbacks elsewhere. Among the programs schedule for cuts: social security, particularly benefits for college students and disability and death benefits: public service jobs—eliminated; food stamps—cut by at least 1 million present recipients: school lunch and milk programs will be sharply reduced; education—cuts in vocational education, education for the poor and handicapped. The list goes on and on—and this is just the first year under the Reagan/Stockman knife.

The choices are straightforward: a hungry child cannot eat a tank. But can Reagan's defense plans prosper when America's inner cities are in rebellion? Can the admirals and generals find the educated people-power to run their complex machines when schools are closed? Can a rapid deployment force "deploy" both in Watts or South Chicago or the South Bronx and at the same time, save Arab oil for Ronald Reagan?

With the Reagan snow job about his "mandate," the defense budget will sail through Congress and the corresponding cuts in social problems will pass. ( Counting voters who voted for other candidates or didn't vote, plus those who didn't even register, about 82% of the American voting-age public did not vote for Reagan; he has still managed to convince Congress of his "mandate.") As yet the cuts haven't been felt; that will begin in October.

And there's one more problem. With all the bucks—our bucks—that Reagan will lavish on the Pentagon, there still must be people to run the tanks and fly the planes. And while social service cuts may force a few more people into the military ( since they have little choice) more and more people are asking what is, in fact, worth fighting for and dying for? Often, the answer is not the career of some overaged two-year old with a new toy who happens to be a general, and not the hysterics of Reagan or Haig about the Soviet Union, and not the fervent wished of U.S. corporations to control the economy of some small country like El Salvador.

Vietnam vets saw how useless was American technological gadgetry against a people who believe in what they were fighting for. We saw officers trying to make careers off the deaths of our friends. We saw American corporations making billions in profits off the blood of the 55,000 who died in Vietnam. And while it may be too late to stop Reagan's bandwagon to stuff the pockets of the Pentagon brass this year, VVAW will continue to take the lessons we learned from the last American war and tell everyone we can, that while the government may take our taxes, they will not get our sons—no matter how many of our dollars they spend!

Pete Zastrow
VVAW National Office