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Stop The WarBy VVAWWhen Nixon inaugurated Vietnamization, he was aware that the DRV/NLF would respond in some manner. This response was assumed to be an offensive (in fact, when the US government awarded the contracts for post-war development of Vietnam back under Johnson, the planners were told to 'expect a major offensive, possibility in 1972, which would fail') on the scale of Tet 1968, in which about 84,000 men participated. Vietnamization was basically planned around this response. It began with the creation of military security cordons along the DMZ, in the Central Highlands and in the Saigon area. Behind this screen, the Thieu regime increased its air force, armored, artillery, and marine strengths all by percentages approaching 100 and its airborne strength by about 30%. These increases were quite evidently aimed at compensating the Thieu regime in terms of firepower for that lost because of the gradual US withdrawals. At the same time a number of attempts were made to forestall the expected offensive. The first of these was the invasion of Cambodia in 1970 which was designed to disrupt NVA/NFL supply capabilities. Although this operation had some short term effect, it was a failure. The second attempt was the Laos operation in 1971, which resulted in 50% casualties for the ARVN forces involved as well as losses of 35 attacks aircraft and almost 500 helicopters, It failed. A third group attempt was made in the summer and fall of 1971 with renewed incursions into Cambodia, but these were stopped after a series of rather blatant ARVN defeats. Thus, it too failed. A fourth attempt was made by means of air attack on the Ho Chi Minh Trail between December 1971 and March 1972. Carried out under the guise of 'protective reaction' and of 'limited duration reprisals,' some 450 fighter bomber and b-52 sorties also failed to prevent the offensive. The final stage was the ARVN moving into position to meet the expected offensive. From ten divisions in 1968, all of which were committed to the support of 'pacification,' the ARVN had moved by 1972 to eleven divisions, seven of which were committed to the conventional military role of the defense of territory. By October of last year, information pointed to a probable NVA/NFL offensive. By January, the US expected it in February or March around Kontum. The offensive actually began at the end of March at the DMZ, taking the US/ARVN high command by surprise. Within ten days of the start of the offensive, the ARVN had effectively lost two of its divisions--the third had fallen apart in the DMZ and the fifth was surrounded at An Loc. Since then the military situation of the Thieu regime has continued to worsen and with this deterioration pressure for new US intervention grew louder. Nixon originally had a set of options which ranged from negotiating in Paris to sending the US ground troops to resuming the bombing of the north. Nixon himself torpedoed the Paris talks (in ways and for reasons not germane to this article). On April 15 he bombed Hanoi and killed 1,700 civilians (the Hanoi population is currently being evacuated). The ostensible reason for the air attacks and the mining of North Vietnamese harbors which followed has been the cutting of the supply flow to the south. This effort requires a daily sortie rate of about a hundred planes with extensive bombing of primary and secondary roads and railroads and because of the necessity for bombing extremely close to the Chinese border (such as on June 7), creates the definite possibility of dangerous international incidents. The second problem with the air power strategy is that it simply will not work. The reasons for this are simple and mathematical. In order to survive as a country, North Vietnam requires daily some 7,000 tons of imports. The offensive in the south itself requires a daily tonnage input of 3,500-3,000 tons North Vietnam has daily transport capacity estimated at some 21,000 tons-6,000 by sea, 7,000 by road, and 8,000 by railroad. Thus, even if the ports were totally closed, the North Vietnamese still retain a daily transport capacity of 15,000 tons wit ha daily need for only 10,000. The problem that Nixon faces is to eliminate that extra 5,000 tons of capacity, but at the same time road and railroad cutting is a highly tenuous strategy. In the first place, all the roads and railroad lines north of Hanoi run through mountain valleys which are excellent sites for antiaircraft guns and SAMS, especially since the attacking planes have to get into the valleys in order to drop their bombs. Further, during the year of heaviest air effort against the north, 1968, it required daily attacks by 275 airplanes merely in order to reduce North Vietnamese road capacity to 3,500 tons. The additional use of 200 more aircraft per day could reduce rail capacity to about 6,400 tons per day. Since it takes a certain number of aircraft sorties also to maintain the mine barrage, the cumulative effect would be to use 500 sorties a day in order to still leave the North Vietnamese with the capacity necessary for their offensive. In fact, the situation is even worse than this because it is estimated that an extra then thousand tons per day are still percolating into the country in small boats and along the Red River. The one action that could seriously affect the supply situation would be the bombing of the river dikes in the north in combination with the above actions since this would increase the import need by about 3,000 tons a day due to the destruction of the rice crops by water. The last time this happened, in 1945 as a result of storms and drought, more than a million people died. Nixon's use of this action would amount to mass genocide. Even so, however, it takes 35 to 40 days for a cargo unloaded at Haiphong to reach the fronts in the south. At the time the US blockaded the harbors, the NVA/NFL already had a substantial stockpile of reserve supplies in the south. Altogether, even if all the supplies from the north are cut off, the NVA/NFL will have the supplies for 75 days of intense fighting. Thus, the earliest that the pace of the offensive could be stopped by supply route bombing would be the end of July. Altogether, bombing is not very practical. Nevertheless, what Nixon has done essentially has been to burn his bridges behind him. There is only one further substantive action that the US can take in South Vietnam and that is the re commitment of ground troops. Although this may not seem likely, the appearance is misleading. The reason is the actual ground situation in the south. At this time Thieu's army, the ARVN, is operating in a series of widely separated and in many cases surrounded areas without any significant reserves. The only way ARVN can respond to a major threat in one area is to strip another of troops. This became particularly clear when the An Loc situation forced the ARVN to withdraw the 21st division along with elements of the 9th division from the Mekong Delta as well as two regiments of the 18th division from the area west of Saigon. In fact, the whole thing is exacerbated by the fact that normally it takes three ARVN line battalions to match an NVA regular battalion. The resultant force ration between the two sides is very instructive: NVA BATTALION EQUIVALENTS: 56 (I Corps/Hue), 26 (II Corps/Kontum) Of the four areas, the one around Hue has now become critical. Hue constitutes a position of tremendous psychological importance to both sides. It is the old Imperial Capital as well as the cultural center of Vietnam. The impact upon the war when the NFL captured it during Tet in 1968 provides a graphic illustration of this. In addition to this, Thieu has made its importance even greater by the way in which he's defending it. Of the 33 battalion-equivalents in the zone, twenty-six are elite units of the ARVN's 1st division or its paratroops, rangers, and marines. These are the only units that have been able to stand against the NVA on a one to one basis and they have done most of the fighting. The paratroops and marines are largely formed of Vietnamese. Catholics and include many who left the north back in 1954. Their defeat would wreck the last vestiges of morale that ARVN has. In addition, if the units were destroyed as well, it would represent the destruction of 85% of the ARVN's elite units. The battle for Hue is going to have the importance of Dienbienphu in the Vietnamese war against the French. The zone has been extremely quiet recently, but this quiet does not represent the end of the offensive. The quiet represents the fact that the NVA forces have to replenish their supplies before a renewed attack. It is important to remember that the NVA never moves before it is absolutely ready. What they are doing now is emplacing artillery, supplies and especially antiaircraft forces all over the province of Thua Thien, in which Hue is located. SAMs emplaced in the Thua Thien hills will be able to shoot at US jets almost as soon as they take off from Da Nang. In addition, as more time passes, the rainfall in Thua Thien is steadily rising toward its peak in September, which will make air operations out of Da Nang more and more difficult. To say that the NVA never attacks during the monsoon season is a delusion; they have done so before not only in Vietnam but also in northern Laos and during the war with the French. In this case, it seems that the stakes are sufficiently high for them to do so. They next three weeks around Hue will be very important and should see the NVA attacking once again. If they do not, it will be as a result of a deliberate policy decision. It will mean that Nixon will be in great trouble in October just before the elections. To say that Nixon and the US generals do not see all of this is also a delusion. They are currently engaged in 'preparing' the American public for a new intervention. This is being done by ranting about the North Vietnamese 'invasion' of the south, which actually constitutes the same type of operation that Northern generals conducted throughout our Civil War. Through Pentagon spokesman Jerry Friedheim, the argument was then made that US bases currently held in Vietnam must be defended in order to insure the 'withdrawal' of American troops. No one has mentioned that one of these bases is at Phu Bai, six miles south of Hue on the Pearl River. It just so happens that because of the range of modern cannons, any defense perimeter for Phu Mai must include the city of Hue. Thus the 'defense of bases' is going to be used as a disguise for a US ground involvement against the wishes of the American people. The involvement has so far taken the following course. Phu Bai was reinforced at the beginning of May to the extent of a battalion of the 196th Infantry Brigade, a sixth of all combat forces then in Vietnam. Later in the month, a force of three battalions at least, one of the 196th, one of the 3rd Brigade 1st Air Cavalry Division (formerly around Saigon), and at least one of the 3rd Marine Division, was established at the Hai Van pass, which guards the approaches to Da Nang. The Marines had been withdrawn from Vietnam long ago but they are now back. They passed through Da Nang in unmarked jungle fatigues with US markings painted out on their vehicles (according to one letter). At the present time the mission of the troops at the Hai Vann pass is being described as 'security duty.' (Friedheim said at the press conference mentioned above that Abrams had every right to replace 'a company of cooks with a company of riflemen'). Other US units of the 3rd Marine Division have been rotated from Okinawa to the Philippines by way of several days stay in Vietnam, mostly on Quang Ngai province where the division was stationed in 1967. In addition, the division's normal helicopter complement has been shifted from El Toro in California to bases in Japan (a Marine division is never committed without its helicopters). There is also the exterior element of the situation. At the present time a brigade each of the 82nd Airborne (Fort Bragg) and the 101st Airborne (Fort Campbell) Divisions are on two-day alert with their equipment packed. The Marine landing force off the coast now has three reinforced battalions and a regiment of the 3rd Division is aboard transports ready for commitment. In real terms this means that Nixon has the capability of intervening almost instantaneously with three battalions to be followed by three further ones within 24 hours. The airborne represents six more battalions that can be in Vietnam within about 76 hours of his decision. At the present time one cannot rule out the possibility of the actual amphibious invasion of the north, around Vinh or Cape Mui Ron, envisioned by Nixon as a reprisal to cut supply lines. After twelve years of insanity the American government has apparently learned nothing. If it is not prevented by the American people, we can easily find ourselves back in 1965.
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