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Iran 'Rescue' Attempt: The Turkey Has Landed

By VVAW

The U.S. invasion of Iran to "save" the U.S. hostages was hailed as a courageous and brave act which met "unforeseen contingencies." in fact, it was a fiasco from top to bottom, ill conceived and carried out in a way which both gravely endangered the hostages and turned international opinion away from any support for the U.S. government. And the U.S. media which, during the Indochina War, often asked difficult questions, gobbled up the whole affair like the turkey it was!

To begin with, the Carter Administration actually believed that the hardest part of the invasion would be the landing in the desert, not the freeing of the hostages at the Embassy. The military advisors who came up with this assessment could have only been trained by watching the U.S. Air Force fight King Kong on the Empire State Building. Carter and his cronies really believed that 90 commandoes were going to fight off the militant students inside the Embassy (students with guns holding groups of hostages in separate rooms—not just one small group of students watching all the hostages), carry off 53 Americans who had been hit with a mysterious knock-out gas, hold off the Iranian Army and Air Force (without any air support, of course) and then safely fly away. And, after the whole affair was botched in its early hours (fortunately, for the hostages) these same military geniuses had the nerve to come before Congress and the American people and say that their plan had a "high probability of success."

The plan was absurd, Any Vietnam vet with combat experience can poke all kinds of holes in it. And it's clear that the Secretary of State also knew it and resigned because of "his experience with the generals during Vietnam who could make impossible plans look good on paper." While Carter and his generals like to hide behind the as-yet unrevealed "further plan (probably two divisions of Marines in full combat gear, hiding behind veils to look like Iranian women—and the two divisions might not have helped much, either), the fact is that their basic plan was nuts, and Vance has sense enough to quit because of it.

As the media described the tactical masterpiece, C-130's loaded with fuel, and 8 helicopters were to land on the old CIA airstrip in the Iranian desert. From there the cammandoes were to take the helicopters into an area near Teheran where they would be met by Iranian sympathizers, taken the American Embassy, knock-out the guards and hostages, get picked up by the helicopters, and fly away. Meanwhile, sympathizers were to be causing diversions all around Teheran.

But in these descriptions, the media neglected a couple of useful questions. Why did the helicopters have to land in the desert to be refueled? They could have been resupplied in mid-air by the same C-130's a situation that happened during rescue missions in Vietnam. Yet the need to refuel the choppers was the rationale for the landing on the deserted airstrip (deserted, of course, except for the busload of Iranian passing by).

Radio transmissions on the rescue flight failed to use even the most elementary scramblers. The transmissions were picked up by ham radio operators in Israel and Europe. Infantry units on the ground in Vietnam used more secure transmissions. The isze of the scramblers is close to an 8-track recorder and about as easy to operate, yet the generals planning this affair apparently forgot that they existed!

And then there's the wallet of Stanley Thomas, Navy aviation mechanic, left behind in Iran. Thomas' reason for having the wallet there was that on these mission, "we weren't ever sure where we'd end up," a statement that puts the planning for the "rescue" into a clear perspective. But what are these highly trained commandoes doing with wallets on this kind of mission in the first place? What happened to the old basic inspection of troops, taught to every recruit, and used time and again in Vietnam? The fact is that the "rescue mission" was a catastrophe waiting to happen.

And then there's the great Vietnam hero, colonel Beckwith who was the ground commander of the mission. He cried, he said, when he saw that his mission was going to fail—and that is his greatest claim to being a hero, though the media unquestioningly devoured his every work. His "combat" experience in Vietnam apparently consisted of taking an armed convoy to a besieged Special Forces Camp; the action resulted in a wounded American and a dead Vietnamese (without weapon). His "combat' ranks somewhere below Tet of '69, Hamburger Hill, Khe Sanh, or Junction City! The media turned this loser into the modern Patton, just as the Carter administration hoped. But in case the memory is short, the "hero" left the dead (who may or may not have been dead when he cut out) left manuals and secret documents intact, and equipment—like helicopters—ready to be used. He was not under attack (unless you count the busload of civilians), yet could not even take the necessary minute to get the bodies and blow the equipment. In fact the Colonel panicked and took off!

The hostages were secondary to the politics of Carter's re-election. The media went right along with the story. The result was 8 Americans dead, the heat off the USSR for its invasion of Afghanistan, allied support for freeing the hostages greatly diminished, and worldwide suspicion of the U.S. military's ability to do anything more complex than blow its nose.

Mrs. Timm, mother of one of the hostages, and a woman who refused to trumpet the Carter line on Iran, was right when she said that some people would rather see the hostages dead in some military action than alive through negotiations. The hostages might well be free today if the U.S. would issue a formal apology (as it did to get back the crew of the Pueblo from North Korea). U.S. crimes in Iran are no secret—the overthrow of the legitimate government back in 1953, the overt and covert support of the Shah for 25 years, CIA training of Iran's secret police. This admission, plus a promise not to interfere again in Iran's affairs, might well get the hostages out.

The role of the media, not only in the "rescue mission" but in their reporting of the entire Iranian revolution was condemned by the CBS anchor man in Chicago (who included himself in the criticism). After spending some time in Iran talking to the Iranian people, he attacked the media for their contribution to building war hysteria.

Until we begin to cut through the propaganda, we only move closer to another war like Vietnam.