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The Gulf War & the New World Order

By Pete Zastrow

Rising from the ashes of the people of Iraq—the men, women and children—is the "New Order" of George Bush.

Exactly what that "New Order"—which Bush has been advertising since the beginning of U.S. occupation of Saudi Arabia—might be is not yet clear to anyone, including George Bush, but there's no doubt who's supposed to be on top: the victorious U.S. of A.

As the Gulf war winds down and the talk is of massive victory parades, it's worth remembering how we got to a point where almost half a million Americans covered the desert of Saudi Arabia, where much of Kuwait and of Iraq are in ruins, and where the much-publicized "fourth largest military" in the world is routed and disgraced.

On the 2nd of August Saddam Hussein sent hundreds of thousands of Iraqi troops storming across the border to seize the small neighboring country of Kuwait. Justification for the invasion was that Kuwait had been stealing Iraqi oil (massive reserves of oil lie under both countries and along the borders) and that Kuwait, by selling more oil than was allowed by an agreement of the oil-producing countries, was stealing the money Iraq needed to realize from oil sales.

Further, in the early days of the invasion, Saddam claimed that borders between Kuwait and Iraq were the work of imperialist powers (which they were) and were invalid—Kuwait thus was declared the 19th province of Iraq. (The border justification—an approach which would make invalid any border drawn by human hand—was given up in the early days of the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to be continued only as part of a litany of a few fringe groups in the United States.)

Finally, it seems clear that, in meetings with the U.S. ambassador and other U.S. officials, Saddam believed he had the passive support of the U.S. government which had supported him quite actively during his 8-year war with Iran. After all, the U.S. had invaded sovereign neighboring countries such as Panama with justifications far more feeble than those motivating Saddam as his troops seized Kuwait.

In response to the Iraqi invasion, and proving that the U.S. leadership was just as motivated by self-interest as the Iraqi's the U.S. began to pour troops into Saudi Arabia. The immediate justification was defense of Saudi Arabia (and its oil supplies) from the Iraqi marauders. Were they really planning to invade Saudi Arabia? We have no way to know, though the justifications Saddam used in Kuwait would not have worked for Saudi Arabia. The U.S. noted that Iraq had far more troops and equipment in Kuwait than was necessary to take that country; but some months later the U.S. would have far more troops than necessary to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Days after the Iraqi invasion, George Bush announced that the U.S. purpose for sending troops to the Middle East was the liberation of Kuwait. At least, unlike Vietnam, there was no rhetorical nonsense about protecting democracy; not even the staunchest Kuwaiti supporter could claim that the Emirate of Kuwait was democratic in any sense. Even after the war was over the Emir of Kuwait would not yet talk about elections in his country, nor about restoring a vaguely representative assembly to advise the Emir.

There were 12 resolutions from the United Nations requiring progressively more drastic measures against Kuwait. UN resolutions served George Bush well and he referred to them often. Older, other resolutions, such as those dealing with the Palestinians have been routinely ignored by the U.S. And we have yet to learn all the trade-offs made by the U.S. in order to secure support for resolutions against Iraq (China's vote in support of the U.S. position seems to have resulted in U.S. government's studied ignoring of a crackdown on dissidents).

George Bush tried to occupy the highest of moral grounds as he painted Saddam Hussein as the "new Hitler" and worse. In eager chorus the U.S. media echoed every accusation made against Saddam; each of his sins was headlined (and there were plenty). In fact, Saddam often seemed the best ally Bush could have asked for—whenever Bush activities were questionable (for instance, the bombing of the air-raid shelter full of civilians in Baghdad) Saddam would do something to make Bush look good.

But Bush's high moral ground turned to swamp when confronted with the track records of some of the U.S. partners in the coalition against Saddam. Ally Turkey still occupies Cyprus; ally Syria occupies Lebanon—and the list goes on and on. Just as telling is the U.S. invasion of Panama, just a little over a year before Operation Desert Shield metamorphosed into Desert Storm: U.S. troops overran a smaller country because of a disagreement with the government. U.S. troops installed a friendly government (which holds power today, more corrupt, from all reports, than the old government ever was). Thousands of Panamanians are still homeless; U.S. promised aid for their country is yet to come. Casualties are still uncounted. And U.S. troops are there today—still operating as the Panamanian police force. The situation differs from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait only because there were no UN resolutions and although much worldwide complaint, no action against the aggressor.

Finally, there was the "new world order," a phrase that seemed to explain everything. What Bush means is still unclear. Some features are clearer, however. "Glasnost" allowed the U.S. to act against Iraq; had the longstanding rivalry between the U.S. and the USSR still survived, the U.S. would never have poured over half a million troops into the Mideast for fear of starting a world war. More than that, George Bush holds the reigns in the only superpower left in the world today. George Bush is impelled to use that power.

In the "new world order" the one superpower will patrol the world. Should anything be amiss, according to the superpower rules, the U.S. will set it straight. Our troops are for hire: if the rulers of Saudi Arabia need our services—and will pay—we'll send troops to the desert. Presumably, should Japan need our troops, we'll provide them—if the price is right. All the U.S. stands to lose is some of its expendable military men and women.

The Gulf War provided the opportunity for more posturing, lying, evading the truth, misleading the media and exalting the military more than any war in history. U.S. military spokesmen regularly met reporters, in front of TV cameras, to lie—live—on worldside TV. The hard questions were never asked—for instance, why was the Iraqi military which, according to U.S. intelligence, was so formidable, falling down in front of U.S. troops? (Either intelligence was wrong or the U.S. military was ballooning the figures in order to make the military performance look better.) Again and again the romance between the military and the media was apparent.

Hundreds of thousands of Americans took to the streets in protest, seeing the Bush lies for what they were—the attempts of the American "wimp" to outgrow his image and assert his fearful masculinity. Ptrotest activities got some play in the press; far too often the peacemakers were portrayed in opposition to those who supported the U.S. troops in the Middle East. That opposing the war, demanding that the military be returned to the U.S. immediately was in the fact the greatest support for our troops was routinely overlooked.

Advanced technology apparently won the war. In Vietnam, advanced technology got a bad name since it seldom worked; in the Mideast War it worked (according to military briefers). No one attempted to explain how smart bombs could destroy civilian-populated bunkers: either there were dumb bombs, dumb pilots, or dumb intelligence. The speed with which the Baghdad bunker full of civilians disappeared from the news was only one of many troublesome moments in the war.

• Press coverage throughout was appalling. While the media did occasionally complain about restrictions—the press pool, for instance—members of the media almost never asked the hard questions and allowed themselves to be used time and again. As, for instance, the land war began, TV superstars refused to talk about what was happening with the military because the military said it might help the enemy. Silence swept the networks—but certainly the Iraqi's knew what was going on, and still, no American correspondent noted that the rules were stupid.
• Stories hit headlines, and the corrections appeared on page 37. Remember the oil slick, headlined as the largest ever, many times bigger than the Exxon Valdiz in Alaska. No one wants to say anything good about Saddam releasing the oil into the Gulf. However, a week or so later we learned (if we looked hard enough) that the slick was only a tenth as large as we had been originally told, and that up to 30% of that was the resuld not of Saddam releasing the oil but of U.S. bombing. The question is not so much why the information was wrong as how much other information was equally wrong and never corrected.
• The treatment of Saddam himself insults the intelligence of people around the world. It seems that Bush and his advisors decided the American people could not understand the need for a war to protect control of oil (while many people may object to this justification, it is at least honest and could be argued). Instead they must create a holy war against the devil himself (or the "new Hitler"). As this article is being written, on the rack at the supermarkets is the tabloid headlining "The Bizarre Sex Life of Saddam Hussein." The U.S. government seemed to need to do the same thing with General Noriega just a year ago—why cannot the American people be presented with the facts and the reasons instead of evil personified. Saddam is bad enough—and kept on doing bad enough things—that his image needed no help from Bush.
• Was the U.S. intelligence so bad that we overestimated the Iraqi military so heavily? Or did the U.S. military exaggerate the danger in order to look good? Did George Bush know he was sending overwhelming military force against a minor enemy?
• Would this war have been fought at all were Iraq not a third world country/ How much was this a racist war.
• What happened to Congress throughout the days leading up to the land war. Many of us saw or heard the feeble debate in Congress before they voted to give Bush a blank check to go to war. Most members of Congress, fearful of being accused of not supporting the noble war, simply gave in to Bush.

All of us have our own questions to add to the list, the moments during the 7 months of Desert campaigns where things didn't quite add up. Maybe it was the military briefing where answers avoided questions instead of answering them. Maybe we were among those who said, "We'll win the war, alright, but then what? Has Bush made any sort of decision of the middle East?"

Four days were all that were needed to finish off the war. Perhaps the enemy was not as formidable as we thought. U.S. troops captured thousands of Iraqi soldiers who often seemed more than passively willing to be captured. U.S. casualties were extremely small (though to the family of a dead soldier "extremely small" looms very large).

After the four days, after the victory with Iraq vanquished and no other opponent looming on the horizon, George Bush has, according to the polls, an approval ratin among the American people of 91%. America can once again stand tall, says Bush and media columnists mimic his every word. Analyzing the world in 500 words, they proudly proclaim that America's shame over Vietnam is now passed. Americans can stick out their chests and be proud.

If the American people are as much behind the war policies of their President as the polls indicate, there is work to be done. Certainly, the Persian Gulf War is not—and never was—a replay of Vietnam. Unlike those who protested the war in Vietnam, almost none of those who fought against the most recent war did so because they thought the "enemy" was right. And the lessons of Vietnam are as relevant today as they were before the Gulf War began.

There is something immensely sad about the flood of welcome homes, the bounce in the walk of the American people now that they have been victorious. Why must we utterly defeat a not-so-potent enemy in order to feel good about ourselves? Why is the American spirit apparently tied to military victory? How many yellow ribbons does it take to hid the fact that the U.S. was once again wrong.

If we agree that Saddam needed to be stopped, might we have put a couple of thousand troops into Saudi Arabia back in August? Could we then still have some of the so-called "peace dividend" which might be used to teach our children that war is a solution to nothing.