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Wounded Men, Broken Promises

By VVAW

WOUNDED MEN, BROKEN PROMISES
HOW THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION BETRAYS YESTERDAY'S HEROES
ROBERT KLEIN

Many vets don't need a book of horror stories about the V.A. —we know them from personal experience. But Robert Klein's Wounded Men, Broken Promises goes well beyond a simple compiling of V.A. atrocities (thought there are plenty of these); based on 2 years of research both inside and outside the V.A., the book tries to explain why the nation's second largest agency (right behind the Defense Department, of course) does such a stinking bad job.

The book primarily takes on the V.A.'s medical care system, including disabilities and the "doms" (where older vets are warehoused). It doesn't try to deal with the massive V.A. educational programs or employment or home loans where the individual vet is overwhelmed by the V.A. bureaucracy.

Klein makes it clear that there are thousands of dedicated workers in the V.A. who, "despite overextended case loads and the interference of heavy-handed bureaucrats, still manage to point their faith and energies toward the promotion of quality care at the V.A."

But in all area of the V.A.'s large kingdom, the system works against such dedicated individuals. Starting at the top, funding comes form Congress which listens—and closely—to traditional vets' organizations. But the VFW and American Legion, which for years have trotted their national commanders into posts as head of the V.A., care little about medical care. First, the various commanders have special codes at the V.A. and they receive markedly better care; second, because members of these groups tend to be established members of their communities, they have less need of relying on V.A. medical care. A close and cozy relationship between the V.A., the vets organizations, Congress and the Defense Department creates a tremendous system of not rocking the boat. So, until recently when more and more Vietnam vets demanded that the V.A. system start doing something for them, the V.A. has been directed away from those who need it most.

Klein sees the times when the V.A. decided to turn its hospitals into research hospitals by allying with medical schools as the point where V.A. care began to go backward. Though the V.A. had the funds, the medical schools called the shots and their needs immediately took precedence over the needs of the vet/patients. One of the worst symptoms of this merger is shown by the fact that during one two-month study, 17, 500 V.A. patients were part of research projects; during another study, 28% of the patients interviewed were not aware they were participants in a research program.

The book provides plenty of evidence for a problem which seems to afflict many bureaucracies: while many workers who are in direct contact with the " customers" are interested in being as helpful as possible, they run into the brick wall of supervisors whose view is "up"—to the next level of management—rather than toward the goal of aiding veterans.

Full of statistics, facts, views from V.A. customers, Klein's book provides an excellent starting point for future investigation of why the V.A. is so bad. But, according to Klein, the situation may be changing because Vietnam vets are making the problems a public issue. "Of the contributions made by the Vietnam combatant to this nation," Klein says, "from the dead soldier to the live veteran, surely the raising of our collective consciousness must be placed at the top."