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Origins of "Gung Ho", Lost Something in the Translation"

By VVAW

When this article appeared in VVAW's "GI NEWS" in October of 1974, U.S. military units were still using the phrase "gung ho" to describe units or GIs who were "model" troops in terms of their enthusiasm for whatever task they were doing. In Vietnam, among the GIs, the meaning began to change--someone who was "gung ho" was at least partly nuts; a gung ho officer was probably out to get himself a medal and kill off as many of his troops as necessary to get it. A gung ho GI wanted to walk point or would extend in country, and for most GIs--who most wanted to get home and get out--that was something only a nut would do, at least voluntarily. So a term which had originally been used by the brass as a kind of rallying call turned into an insult. But neither use of the term "gung ho" had much to do with the origin of the term; in fact, the U.S. military could not afford to let the beginnings of the term get out to us.

The term "Gung Ho" comes from China; it was introduced to the Marine Corps by Colonel E.F. Carlson when he formed the 2nd raider Battalion during the early days of World War II. The battalion grew famous enough so that there was a movie about the Battalion and their Makin raid called "Gung Ho." But the history of Carlson, the Raiders, and "gung ho" has been carefully hidden.

"Gung Ho" originated in the Peoples Liberation army (PLA) in China, led by Mao Tse-Tung, Chu The, and Chou En-Lai, all of whom were personal friends of Carlson. He had met them while he was a U.S. military observer in China in the late 1930's. Carlson spent months marching, studying and fighting with the Red Army. While doing so, he learned an entirely new way (for him) of running a military operation. When he returned to the U.S. he tried to tell the American people that it was the Communists, the Red Army, that was leading the struggle against Japanese imperialism (Japan invaded china in 1931) and that they had a new and better way of organizing their military. Carlson called this style of military work "gung ho" from the Chinese slogan "work together." So after he returned to the U.S. Carlson was ordered by the Navy Department to cease talking about China, the Red Army, and "gung ho." Carlson refused from the Marine Corps so that he could continue to speak out.

When it became obvious in early 1941 that war with Japan was inevitable, Carlson rejoined the Corps and fought for the chance to form a guerilla battalion, organized on the basis of the gung ho principles that he had learned from Mao, Chu the and Chou En-Lai. After Pearl Harbor and Wake, the defeats in the Philippines and Malaya, he was given permission to form a new type of unit, christened the 2nd raider Battalion.

"Gung Ho" meant many things to the raiders, but two of them stand out. The first was the absolute equality between officers and enlisted men. Raider officers ate the same food, slept in the same bunks, wore the same uniform as the enlisted men. They dug their own latrines and carried their own packs. Officers did not order their men to do anything that they--the officers--were not willing and able to do first. There were regular weekly meetings between all the officers and men where the men were encouraged to speak their minds freely, to criticize the non-coms and officers if they deserved it. Officers and non-commissioned officers had to earn the respect of the men who they led. If they failed to do so, if they felt they were to lead, they were kicked out of the Raiders. The enlisted men were treated with respect. Their ideas were both solicited and respected. And as a result the men trusted their officers.

The second major element of "Gung Ho" was knowledge and political understanding about why and how they were fighting. Like the principles of military organization, this was taken from the PLA where political education and discussion was seen as a vital part of military operations. Carlson believed that the war was against fascism and that defeating the Japanese would be a positive step for everyone. Carlson had nothing to fear from free and open discussion with the troops because he practiced what he preached. Democracy, respect and human dignity were all part of the 2nd Battalion.

The "Gung Ho" meetings covered much more than criticism of officers and what the war was about. Before each mission and whenever possible in the field, there was a full discussion with the men to explain the necessity of the mission, what the aims were, the tactics being planned, and how this mission fit into the overall picture.

The raiders were involved in heavy fighting throughout the war during which their 1000 man battalion suffered a remarkably low 17 casualties. Other units began to write and ask about "Gung Ho." Newspaper articles were written. Enlisted people in other units began to talk about "Gung Ho.'

Suddenly, the brass promoted Carlson to the job of plans officer for the 4th Marine Division. He was never again allowed to command troops. A new C.O. was appointed for the Raiders and his first orders were to eliminate Gung Ho meetings and re-institute saluting. All Gung Ho changes were quickly ended.

The brass destroyed the true "Gung Ho" (and in the process co-opted the term for their own uses) for two reasons. Most U.S. officers knew they could not lead their men based on the men's acceptance of their leadership; and not many officers were ready to give up the privileges of their rank.

More important, however, was the principle of winning over the troops to a political understanding of why a war is being fought. When, as was the case in World War II, winning that war was in the interests of the vast majority of the American--and world--people, it's possible to carry on the kind of discussion that was part of "Gung Ho." But the U.S. government had other plans for the U.S. military at the end of World War II. One plan called the invasion of mainland China to support Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary government against the revolutionary Red Army. The attempt to stop growing revolutionary and liberation movement in Korea, in the Phillipines and in Vietnam was also being plotted in the secret halls of Washington, DC. The "Back Home Movement" which grew among numbers of GIs at the end of the war put a serious crimp in all these master plans.

It's hard to imagine U.S. officers in Vietnam attempting to explain to the GIs why there was a need to prop up the government of President Thieu or why it was in the interest of the GIs to fight against the NLF soldiers who had the same interests that we did--freedom and liberation. In fact as the Vietnam war went on, some elements of the "Gung Ho" concept did appear, though not in the way Carlson used them. U.S. troops simply refused to carry out ridiculous orders from their officers and, as there were more and more incidents of rebellion and resistance, as more and more people--including Vietnam veterans--hit the streets in the U.S., and most important, as the Indochinese people refused to retreat, the U.S. was forced out of that unjust war.